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THE ANDEAN CODE AFTER FIVE YEARS
ROBERTO DANINO*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Andean Foreign Investment Code1 is likely to attract much atten-
tion again since it has recently been announced that a set of regulations
is being prepared for the Code's uniform implementation throughout the
Andean market. These regulations certainly appear to be a necessity for
overcoming the severe uncertainties and lack of uniformity in the Andean
countries' implementation of many of the Code's provisions.
The Andean Code's political and ecouiomic rationale has been analyzed
ad nauseam from a variety of perspectives. 2 Therefore, this paper will be
confined to the less grandiose, but perhaps more useful task of analyzing
the Code in the light of the implementation achieved since it was adopted
by the Andean Group five years ago. It is hoped that identifying the
main problems and divergent attitudes regarding the implementation of the
Code in the various Andean countries will prove helpful to the preparation
of an adequate set of regulations.
The Code encompasses two systems for controlling foreign investment.
First, there is a body of rules (hereafter referred to as the "system of
controls") governing the entry of foreign investment; the approval of
reinvestments, profit, and capital remittances abroad; use of credit; trans-
fers of technology; and jurisdictional matters. The second system (here-
after referred to as "divestment") requires foreign investors to sell to
national investors, progressively and in a limited number of years, the
majority share of their investments in the enterprises operating in the host
country. The emphasis of this paper will be on the system of controls
rather than divestment because the implementation of divestment has been
more limited in scope than that of the system of controls. This is due,
among other reasons, to the proviso in the Code requiring a delay of at
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least three years for companies to start divesting. Peru is the Andean coun-
try which has accumulated the most significant experience with this system
because its internal laws required owners of manufacturing industries to
divest even before the Andean Code was adopted.
Since the Code is structured as a key feature of a general develop-
mental strategy purportedly common to all Andean countries, the analysis
will be preceded by a brief introduction to that strategy. Thus placed in
context, each of the rules encompassed by the system of controls will be
examined, especially concerning its implementation in the manufacturing
sector. Thereafter, a short reference will be made to divestment in Peru.
II. THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS: A'N OVERALL VIEW
Since 1969 six South American countries--Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela3 (hereinafter referred to as the Andean
Group)-have been working on an ambitious scheme for economic develop-
ment through integration. Their premise is that only an intense and pro-
found integration process will accelerate their development. The scheme
effectuating this premise was established by a treaty known as the Andean
Pact;4 through it they expect to achieve a true economic common market
which by 1985 will comprise 106 million inhabitants and generate a gross
internal product of at least 85 billion dollars. 5
A. General
The Andean Group has conceived "integration as a process basically
oriented to promote its development overcoming all forms of domination
and dependency. ' ' 6 As this declaration reveals, the Andean integration
process is conceived within the framework of the dependencia theory. 7
This theory purports not merely to describe underdevelopment, but to
identify its basic cause: an international system of social, political and
cultural domination. Furthermore, this international domination is con-
ceived to be similarly structured in several regions of the world, although
the focal point of contemporary empirical analysis has been the relations
of Latin America with the U.S. This relationship is pictured as consisting
of a center-country which dominates a number of countries on its periph-
ery. Such domination is asserted to have been implemented within each
peripheral country through the fostered formation and growth of a minor-
ity ruling class which acts as an intermediary for the achievement of the
interests of the center-country, and which achieves a concentration of
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wealth and power. It thus dominates the vast majority of the population
and is believed to have generated within each peripheral country the
existence of two societies in clearly different stages of development, one
modern and the other primitive. Their relationship is causal interdepend-
ency: the modern society developed and continues to develop through
dominating the primitive society, and the primitive society remains under-
developed because of that dominance. In the international sphere, the same
kind of relationship is believed to be reproduced: the center-country main-
tains its condition through dominating its peripheral countries, and the
peripheral countries remain underdeveloped because of that dominance.
Thus, from this perspective, there are two crucial 'factors to be attacked
in order to achieve development: the international structure of domination,
known as dependencia, and the internal structure of domination, known as
"dominacion."s
The Andean countries have realized that isolated efforts must fail and
that the integration of their efforts is perhaps the only way to achieve
sustained development 9 Oversimplified, this is the political framework
within which the Andean integration process has been conceived.
B. Structure
1. TECHNICAL
Technically, the Andean Pact should be viewed as an outgrowth of the
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). 1° By accelerating their
process of development, the Andean countries also wish to achieve the
relative economic homogeneity which LAFTA requires to succeed. By the
time the Andean Pact was conceptualized, LAFTA had become stagnant.
This was mainly due to the great differences in stages of development
among LAFTA countries. The less developed members were greatly con-
cerned that the benefits of the free trade area, which was LAFTA's primary
goal, would not be equally shared due to the higher stage of development
of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (ABRAMEX)." It was feared that
ABRAMEX would benefit from the tariff concessions which were imple-
mented on a "most-favored-nation" basis 12 to the detriment of the other
less developed members. The tariff negotiations, already entangled in the
product-by-product manner in which they were conducted, became stagnant
by 1969.13
Nevertheless, the Andean Group learned much from the LAFTA
experience. Integration requires a relative economic homogeneity among
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the participants or at least corrective regulations which allow unequals to
be treated unequally. 14 This lesson is reflected in the privileges which the
Andean Pact has provided for Bolivia and Ecuador in recognition of the
relatively inferior stage of their development. 1" It is inefficient to negotiate
tariff concessions on a product-by-product basis. Thus, the Andean Pact
provides an automatic and irreversible system of tariff concessions, dis-
cussed below.16
The Andean Group has not abandoned LAFTA, however. By accel-
erating their development, the Andean countries expect to better participate
in LAFTA and forward its goals. In this sense, the Andean integration is
not independent of, but rather complementary to LAFTA.17
2. INSTITUTIONAL
The Andean integration process is conducted by a political entity,
the Comisi6n,ls and by a technical entity, the Junta,19 both headquartered
in Lima. The Commission, composed of one plenipotentiary representative
from each member country, is charged with developing the integration
scheme. It acts through Decisiones. The Junta, directed by three officers
unanimously elected by the Commission, supervises the implementation of
the Andean Pact and the Commission's Decisions. It acts through Resolu-
ciones. In addition to being the Permanent Secretariat of the Andean
Group, the Junta conducts research studies and coordinates activities. In
this connection, one of its most important duties is the preparation of
proposals for the consideration of the Commission, which become Decisions
if adopted. Decisions adopted by the Commission must be enacted into
national law by each country to have internal legal effect. However, under
international law and the treaty obligations imposed under the Andean
Pact, once a Decision is adopted the member states become bound to put
it into effect. Any system in which the members were free to ignore the
Decisions of the Commission would render those decisions mere proposals
and be contrary to the language of the Andean Pact. It would also defy
logic. Nevertheless, many important Decisions have not been implemented
long after they were originally approved and long after the deadlines for
doing so had passed. 20
The Group is attempting to rectify these difficulties, through, for
example, the proposal to form an Andean Court of Justice. 21 This Court
would have exclusive authority to interpret the Andean Pact and the
Decisions. It would also judge disputes between member states, the Com-
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mission, the Junta, or the individual citizens of any Andean country
relating to the implementation, interpretation, or violation of the Andean
Pact or the Decisions.
Another major institutional organ is the Andean Development Cor-
poration 22 (Corporaci6n Andina de Fomento, known as CAF). The Group's
common financing entity, CAF, is headquartered in Caracas. Initially, its
main role had been to channel foreign and subregional lending into the
projects and industries which have a high priority in the integration
scheme.2 3 CAF is now expanding into other financial areas, such as capital
market development and other subregional savings mechanisms. 24
The institutional structure also includes a Consultative Committee
and an Economic and Social Committee,2 5 as well as Advisory Councils
on education, finance, fiscal policy, foreign commerce, health, infrastruc-
tural integration, monetary and foreign exchange, planning, tourism, and
social affairs.26
The Consultative Committee is the Junta's contact with the member
governments on particular issues. The Economic and Social Committee is
designed as a channel of communication between the non-governmental
economic sector and the Group's major organs. The Advisory Councils
have been created to bring together experts, appointed by the member
governments, in order to advise the Junta on long-range or specific policy
matters in their areas of special competence.2 7
In short, this is the institutional structure which has been developed
to implement and monitor the Andean integration scheme.
C. Developmental Strategy
The Andean Pact scheme of integration is a development strategy2"
composed of five interdependent programs which are briefly summarized
below.
The primary goal of the integration process is to create an Andean
Common Market (ANCOM). Toward this end, a Trade Liberalization
Program29 seeks to eliminate all tariffs and restrictions on the importation
of goods produced in any member country. 30 Existing trade barriers will
be partially eliminated by 1980 and will be completely eliminated by
1990.31 In this way, not only will the chronic insufficiency of isolated
markets in each country be overcome, but economics of scale inherent in
an enlarged market will be realized.
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To support Andean producers, a Common External Tariff 32 is applied
to products imported from non-Andean countries. The scope of this tariff
will be expanded, so that by 1980 it will cover all products.
Another key feature of ANCOM is the Sectoral Industrial Develop-
ment Program. 33 This program seeks to eliminate both duplication of
industrial capacity and inefficiency within industries by promoting indus-
trial specialization. Certain industrial sectors, as well as product categories
within each sector, are being selected for development and allocated exclu-
sively to one or two member countries for a fixed number of years.
34
These selected industries and products are granted special external tariffs
and trade liberalization incentives and are entitled to partial financing
from CAF.
The physical bases of ANCOM's industrialization are also being
developed and integrated.3 5 Efforts towards this goal are currently focused
on eliminating infrastructural bottlenecks in transportation, communica-
tions and energy supply.
ANCOM has also implemented an Agricultural Development Program36
which seeks to expand agricultural production by coordinating the indi-
vidual agricultural policies and developmental plans of the member coun-
tries through such means as joint production programs and common
systems of marketing, financing, and research. Expanded agricultural
production is expected to increase income and demand within the agricul-
tural sector and also to generate greater amounts of raw materials. Thus,
through these results, it is also intended to further the goal of industrial
development.
Finally, the Andean Pact has adopted a program designed to har-
monize and coordinate the social and economic policies of the member
countries.3 7 One of the most important tangible results achieved to date
by this program is the creation of a "Common Regime for the Treatment
of Foreign Capital, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties."
III. THE ANDEAN CODE
A. General
Since its inception, the Andean Group has been cognizant of the
crucial role which foreign investment and technology must play in ANCOM.
The usual problem caused by regulating foreign investment in an individ-
ual country is magnified in ANCOM because a common market requires
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increased financial and technological resources. Thus, the Andean nations
became convinced that their isolated efforts could not efficiently cope with
the bargaining power of foreign providers of such resources. Only enforce-
ment of common investment regulation by all member countries can effect
this result.
The need to adopt a common framework for foreign investment was
emphasized by most Latin American countries' recent experience of what
is now known as the "protectionist paradox." In the 1950's, these countries
fixed high tariffs on the import of goods also produced locally. This action,
however, induced foreign investors to establish local plants, especially in
the manufacturing industries. This type of restraint on foreign investments
made in the absence of any major control or restriction proved to be
counterproductive. The local producers were displaced by the foreign
investors, and the degree of dependencia increased. 38
Consequently, the Andean Pact specifically required the Commission
to enact a common regulatory system for foreign investment by December
31, 1970.39 On that date, the Commission adopted Decision 24 through
which a "Common Regime for the Treatment of Foreign Capital, Trade-
marks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties" was approved. This Decision was
modified by Decisions 37 and 37a (hereafter collectively referred to as
the "Andean Code" or simply "the Code") and, as amended, has been
enacted as local law in all of the six Andean countries. 40
The Code's effectiveness, let it be emphasized, depends upon its uni-
form implementation by each Andean country. Even though some margin
of difference was given to each country in recognition of differing eco-
nomic conditions, there are a number of basic rules which were designed
to be applied without modification, as we shall see. The joint and uniform
application of such rules was conceived to be an unavoidable prerequisite
for strengthening the bargaining power of the member countries since in
the absence of these rules the foreign investors could easily play off one
country against another. 41 Their enforcement was thus conceived to be a
means of effectively increasing the bargaining power of the host countries,
and averting a war of incentives to obtain foreign resources.
42
Accordingly, the Code has expressly precluded better treatment for
foreign investors than that offered nationals.4 3 Furthermore, rights granted
by the Code to enterprises of foreign or mixed ownership are established
as the maximum which any member country is allowed to grant." Any
country may be more restrictive, but in no case may they be less restric-
tive than the Code prescribes.45
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In addition, the member countries have agreed not to establish any
incentives to foreign investment other than those contemplated by their
industrial development laws at the time the Code became effective. This
commitment is to be maintained until the member countries implement the
program for common industrial development legislation. 46 The general
provisions for this effort at harmonization were issued through Decisions
49 and 49a; thus far, however, neither has been enacted nor put into
practice by any member country.47
Additionally the uniform implementation of the Code is seen as one
of the principal ways in which the Andean countries can achieve and
maintain an adequate inflow of foreign investment and technology. From
the beginning, one of the most common and legitimate complaints of
foreign investors has been focused on the uncertainty surrounding the
legal framework in which their activities are regulated by host govern-
ments. "In contrast with his situation in [a developed country], the
investor contemplating establishment in many less developed countries
• . . is apt to discover that one of his chief legal problems is the sheer
difficulty of finding with any degree of precision what his rights and
obligations are."'48 ".. . ['C] apital wants to know the rules of the game:
whatever the host country decides they may be."'49
The two incentives designed to assure an adequate supply of capital
and technology in ANCOM are the certainty and stability of a legal frame-
work common to the six countries, and the economies of scale inherent
in the Andean Common Market.
In sum, the common enforcement of the Code was conceived to be
essential for both the protection of the host countries and the encourage-
ment of foreign investment in their territories. As stated by the Preamble
of the Code:
The rules of the common regime must be quite clear in formulat-
ing the rights and obligations of foreign investors and the guar-
antees which foreign investment shall receive in the subregion.
Moreover, they must be sufficiently stable for the mutual benefit
of the investors and the Member Countries.
B. Enactment
As required by the Andean Pact, the Code was adopted in each
member country as local law on June 30, 1971; by Bolivia through Decree
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09798, by Ecuador through Decree 974, by Chile through Decree 482,50
and by Peru through Decree-Law 18900.
In Colombia, extensive constitutional litigation, which went so far as
to question the validity of the adoption of the Andean Pact, 51 considerably
delayed the effective enactment of the Code. It was finally adopted on
September 15, 1973 through Decree 1900 issued pursuant to Law 8a of
that year. 52 In -Chile as well, the Contraloria originally objected to the
adoption of the Code. Such objection, however, was promptly overcome
by a Decree of insistencia from President Allende.5 3 More recently, in
July, 1974 Chile enacted Decree-Law 600 purporting to limit the enforce-
ment of the Code to those investors who wished to benefit from the tariff
concessions in LAFTA or ANCOM. Under strong pressure from the other
Andean countries, however, Chile issued Decree 746 on November 6, 1974,
and the full effectiveness of the 'Code in her territory was ratified thereby.
54
Six months after adopting the Code, Bolivia enacted a law providing cer-
tain tax and import incentives, as well as investment guarantees. These
incentives were considered a violation of the Code provision which pro-
hibits member countries from enlarging the foreign investment incentives
beyond those in existence on the date the Code became effective. Bolivia
asserted, however, that these incentives were designed for general invest.
ments and did not relate specifically to those of foreign origin. Conse-
quently, they do not violate Article H of the Transitory Dispositions of the
Andean Code.55
Finally, Venezuela approved the Code together with the Andean Pact
by law dated September 13, 1973, and they were implemented through
Regulations 62 and 63, effective April 29, 1974.56
C. Competent National Authority
In order to apply the rules of the Code, each member country is
required to designate a competent national authority 57 (hereafter referred
to as CNA). This entity supervises the performance of the obligations
incurred by investors and authorizes the exercise of their rights under the
Code. In addition, it is responsible for compiling all statistical data con-
cerning the activities of foreign investors in the country.
This agency is intended to efficiently and coherently administer the
Code's rules and thereby avoid the problems which arise when a variety
of different public agencies deal with similar matters. To achieve uniform
implementation throughout the six countries, the Junta was charged with the
LAWYER OF rHE AMERICAS
duty of coordinating the activities of each country's CNA. 58 Coordination
of this activity is also intended to provide an opportunity for an exchange
of information, experience, and reciprocal advice among the various CNAs
and the Junta.
In practice, however, these commendable goals have not been fully
achieved. In several instances there have been great delays in establishing
the CNAs, while some countries have tended to designate several agencies
as CNAs instead of appointing a single entity.
This latter action has created numerous problems. Jurisdictional over-
lappings often occur within the same country since the jurisdiction of
each CNA is not always clearly delineated. Worse, contradictory construc-
tions of the Code are sometimes sponsored by different CNAs within the
same jurisdiction. In one case, for example, this occurred in connection
with a royalty payment. The contract for the transfer of technology was
approved and authorized by one CNA, while the CNA empowered to
regulate foreign exchange denied authorization to purchase foreign cur-
rency to pay for the technology on the ground that the contract was illegal
under the Code. In another case, a foreign commercial air carrier received
authorization from the Ministry of Transportation to establish a branch
office. However, the Ministry of Commerce later claimed that authorization
should have been obtained from it and that, therefore, the investment was
illegal.
It seems increasingly clear that the failure to vest authority in a single
CNA hinders the effective implementation of the Code. It is equally clear
that a single entity would better administer affairs at the local level and
would also facilitate the Junta's task of coordination which, partly because
of the internal situation in some countries, has not been accomplished.
Fortunately, awareness of the convenience of having a single CNA seems
to be growing, and the necessary steps are being taken in some countries. 59
D. Classifications
The Code concerns investors who are classified as national or foreign,
and enterprises classified as national, mixed, or foreign. 60
1. INVESTORS
National investors are defined as the state, national natural persons,
national juridical persons who do not pursue a profit-making purpose, and
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national enterprises (as defined infra). Foreign natural persons, residing
without interruption for one year in the country of the investment are
also considered as national investors, provided they renounce before the
CNA their right to repatriate both capital and profits. In accordance with
Decision 48 of the Commission, the Andean Development Corporation,
CAF, is also considered a national investor.
It must be noted that renunciation of the right to repatriate capital
and profits is expressly limited to natural persons and thus is unavailable
to juridical persons. The scope of such renunciation has been interpreted
in contradictory fashions. In Ecuador, it may be available with respect to
a single investment out of the various ventures which a foreigner may
have made in that country. Apparently, under this construction a foreign
individual may have some investments classified as national and some as
foreign at the same time.6 1
Peru, however, believes that partial renunciations would foster the use
of the nationalized investments as a means of generating additional profits
or other benefits for the investments which remain foreign. As a result of
this view, the renunciation must cover the right to re-export all capital or
profits owned by the investor.6 2
Investors who are citizens of an Andean country other than the one
in which the investment is made are not within the definition of national
investors. This matter was extensively discussed by the drafters of the
Code, who concluded that the investments of Andean nationals in Andean
countries other than their own would be more helpful to the integration
process if channeled through Andean Multinational Enterprises rather than
made individually.63
However, the Decision providing for the creation of the Andean Multi-
nationals, has not yet been implemented; it will become effective when all
the member countries have enacted it, and, thus far, Ecuador and Peru
have not done so.14 Hence, Andean citizens currently investing in countries
other than their own remain characterized as foreign investors. Also,
Decision 48, which establishes that CAPs investments will be considered
as national investments, has been adopted to date, only by Bolivia, Colom.
bia, Chile, and Peru.
Foreign investors are defined in the Code as the owners of a direct
foreign investment, which is defined in turn, as "contributions to the capital
of an enterprise coming from abroad and owned by foreign individuals or
enterprises [as defined infra] and made in freely convertible currency,
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industrial plants, machinery or equipment entitled to value repatriation
and profits remittance abroad." These, along with those investments in
local currency generated by such resources, may be remitted abroad along
with profits.
A direct foreign investment may take either of the three following
forms: a) freely convertible currency, construed by countries with foreign
exchange controls such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia, as "foreign exchange
that is both not part of the foreign exchange resources of the country and
commonly accepted in its international transaction;"65 b) industrial plants,
machinery, or equipment, whose importation is subject to different require-
ments established by the industrial laws of each member country;66 or c)
national currency entitled to be transferred abroad. This latter concept
encompasses, in principle, the foreign investor's initial investment; rein-
vestments, together with any capital gains or less any net losses; amounts
remittable abroad for royalties, service fees, and credit and interest due;
and net profits. All forms of investment require the prior approval of the
local CNA. When made, they must also be registered with the CNA in
freely convertible currency 67 (as defined) to assure the relative mainte-
nance of their value in case of a local devaluation.
It must be noted as well that several of the provisions distinguish
between the foreign investments which existed at the time the Code
became effective in each country (hereafter referred to as "old foreign
investment") and those investments which entered after that date (here-
after referred to as "new foreign investment"). It may be helpful to recall
that the Code became effective on July 1, 1971 in all the Andean countries
except Colombia and Venezuela.
2. ENTERPRISES
The Code classifies enterprises as national, mixed, or foreign.6 8 The
enterprises are distinguished not on the basis of the ownership of capital,
but rather on the identity of those holding effective control. Ownership is
only a juris tantum factor used in determining who is in control. There-
fore, the definitions establish national ownership percentages which in
the opinion of the CNA, must be reflected in the technical, financial, ad-
ministrative, and commercial control of the erterprise.69
The Code utilizes the word enterprise (empresa in Spanish) and not
corporation in order to describe a broader range of business entities than
THE ANDEAN CODE
just juridical persons. This was confirmed by the all-inclusive definition
of enterprise in Decision 40: "[E]nterprise is an organization created by
one or more persons to pursue a profit oriented activity."
From this perspective, a national enterprise is an enterprise orga-
nized in the recipient country more than eighty percent of whose capital
is owned by national investors. That proportion must be reflected in the
technical, financial, administrative, and commercial management of the
enterprise, as determined by the CNA.
A mixed enterprise is an enterprise organized in the recipient coun-
try which demonstrates that between fifty-one and eighty percent of its
capital is owned by national investors. Again, that proportion must be
reflected in the technical, financial, administrative and commercial man-
agement of the enterprise, according to the judgment of the CNA. Alter-
natively, in accordance with Decision 47 adopted by Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru, enterprises in which the state or state-enterprises own at least
30% of the stock will also be considered mixed enterprises provided that
the state or a state-enterprise has decision-making capacity. That capacity
is construed as the requirement that the representatives of the state or of
the state-enterprise concur in the fundamental decisions of the activities of
the enterprise. A state-enterprise is defined as one in which the state
owns more than eighty percent of the capital and has determining capacity.
Finally, a foreign enterprise is defined as an enterprise in which
national investors own less than fifty-one percent of the capital or in which
that percentage of national ownership is not reflected in the technical, ad-
ministrative, or commercial management of the enterprise in the opinion
of the CNA. This definition of foreign enterprise has proven to be ex-
cessively broad. Indeed, as it stands, it includes both the parent company
abroad as well as its local subsidiary.
An important failing for countries having to deal with multinational
enterprises is the lack of legal concepts which describe the whole orga-
nization. As a result the MNEs' components are treated as single entities.
While the definition of foreign enterprise established in the Code is aimed
toward overcoming this problem, it fails to differentiate between parent
company and subsidiary. Some provisions of the Code designed to refer
only to the local subsidiary technically apply also to the parent because the
Code term "foreign enterprise" technically encompasses both.70 The uni-
form implementation of the Code thus requires an express differentiation
between the two.
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Finally, this set of definitions does not adequately define the status
of the investments made by a mixed enterprise. Indeed, how should en-
terprise X be classified if it is owned and controlled in equal proportions
by mixed enterprise A, with seventy-nine percent of national control, en-
terprise B, also with seventy-nine percent of national control, and national
enterprise C, with one hundred percent of national control? According to
a literal construction of the foregoing definitions, only enterprise C, and
not enterprises A or B, is a national investor. Thus, only thirty-three per-
cent of enterprise X is subject to national control, and it remains a foreign
enterprise even though all its shareholders are enterprises controlled in
the majority by national investors. This result seems illogical and unjust
and highlights the need to regulate the status of investments made by
mixed enterprises. There are a number of additional queries concerning
these definitions. They will be analyzed through the examination of the
two mechanisms of the Code: controls and divestment.
IV. CONTROLS
A. Authorization
Foreign investments in an Andean country must be authorized by the
CNA in the recipient country.7 1 The application to the CNA must con-
tain, at the minimum, information regarding the investor's identity,
financial resources in foreign exchange or credit, physical or tangible re-
sources, recources derived from technology or intangibles, and also a brief
explanation of how the proposed investment will satisfy specified needs
of the recipient country. 72 The application must also contain a plan for
divestment and outline the schedule of development of the investment.7 3
Utilizing this information and any additional data it may request,
the CNA evaluates the application and grants an authorization if the pro-
posal fits within the development priorities of the country and is not
barred by certain restrictions which are discussed below.
This requirement of prior authorization is designed to enable the
recipient countries to judge their development policies and priorities in
light of which investments are really needed.74 The underlying assumption
is that indiscriminate foreign investment per se is not necessarily an aid
to development. If, on the other hand, foreign investment is admitted under
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a selective policy, based on a previously determined and planned strategy
for development, it can be highly beneficial to the interests of the recipient
country.75
1. RESTRICTIONS
The Andean countries have agreed to restrict direct foreign invest-
ments, as follows:
a) No foreign investment may be authorized for the purchase of
stock, shares, or other ownership rights belonging to national investors.7 6
The only exception is for the purchase of the rights of a national investor
in order to prevent the bankruptcy of the enterprise. The CNA must
verify the imminence of bankruptcy prior to authorizing the purchase.
To obtain such authorization, two further conditions must be met: 1) the
enterprise must prove it has offered national or sub-regional investors a
preferential purchase option; and 2) the foreign investor must commit
himself to resell the rights purchased to national investors in a period
not exceeding fifteen years.77
b) No foreign investment will be authorized in areas which the
CNA deems adequately served by existing enterprises.78
c) Intangible technological resources do not qualify as capital con-
tributions.7 9 However, the amounts due for authorized technology roy-
alties may be authorized as a foreign investment insofar as they constitute
resources which have the right to be remitted abroad. 0
d) Foreign investment for projects involving products reserved to
Ecuador or Bolivia under the Industrial Programs may not be authorized
by other Andean countries in their territories.8'
2. RESERVED SECTORS
The member countries are authorized to restrict further the entry of
foreign investment in economic sectors reserved for national development.8 2
Also, the Code barred foreign investment in enterprises dedicated to
domestic transportation, advertising, radio broadcasting, television, news-
papers, and domestic marketing of products of any type; 3 insurance,
commercial banking, and other financial activities;84 public utilities such
as water, drainage, electric power and public lighting, health and sanita-
tion services, telephones, mail, and telecommunications.' 5 In addition, these
enterprises are subject to more rapid divestment.86
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The Code, however, also authorized member countries to apply dif-
ferent rules in these sectors, both with respect to the authorization restric-
tions and the faster divestment, "if special circumstances so require."
8 7
Complete information regarding the actual use each country has made of
this provision is not available; however, two recent surveys in this connec-
tion indicate as follows: 8 s
Bolivia: Foreign banks and finance institutions may be authorized under
the conditions provided by Supreme Decree 11450 of 1974.
Chile: Decree 746 of 1974 has exempted all of the above sectors from
the authorization restrictions and faster divestment. These sectors are
regulated in that regard by Decree 600 of 1974. (93)
Colombia: Decree 2719, dated December 28, 1973, allows direct foreign
investment in commercial banks and other financial institutions, and
also in enterprises dedicated to the internal commercialization of prod-
ucts. This same Decree establishes that no foreign direct investment
will be authorized in insurance, television, radio, newspapers, maga-
zines, nor in internal transportation enterprises. Existing companies
in these areas must become national enterprises by September 15,
1976.
Ecuador: Supreme Decree 1029, dated July 13, 1971, exempted from the
authorization restrictions and the faster divestment requirement, in-
vestments in the following sectors: public services, insurance, commer-
cial banks and other financial institutions, internal transportation,
publicity, commercial radios, television, newspapers, magazines, and
internal commercialization of products.
Peru: Initially, Decree Law 18900, dated June, 1971, exempted all the
reserved sectors from the authorization restriction and the faster di-
vestment. However, foreign investment in these sectors has been re-
stricted through a series of subsequent laws, and most of the enter-
prises operating therein are obliged to become national or mixed,
except for some banks and commercialization enterprises which
already existed when the Code became effective.
Venezuela: Regulation 62, dated April, 1974, established that no foreign
investment would be authorized in the following sectors: telephones,
mail, telecommunications, potable water and sewers, electricity, and
services of vigilance and security; television, radio, newspapers, and
magazines in Spanish, unless they are of scientific or cultural nature;
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internal transport of goods and persons, advertising, and internal com-
mercialization of goods and services, except for those produced by the
foreign investor in the country; enterprises dedicated to consulting,
advice, design, and analysis of projects which require the service of
professionals whose activity is regulated by national laws. The en-
terprises already operating in any of these sectors are required to
become national before May 1, 1971. Investments in banking, financ-
ing, insurance, and tourism activities remain subject to the previous
Venezuelan laws, not to the authorization restriction and faster di-
vestment required by the Code.
Despite the special rules each country has implemented regarding
the authorization restrictions and faster divestment, it should be noted
that all foreign investment in these sectors remains subject to all the
other controls, that is to say, to the rules on reinvestments, profit and
capital remittances abroad, credit use, transfers of technology, and juris-
diction.90 It should also be noted that the regular system of divestment
provided by the Code does not apply in these sectors.91 Thus, it mainly
applies in the manufacturing industry.
Foreign investment in basic resources may be authorized under con-
cession contract during the ten-year period after the Code becomes ef-
fective but no contract term may exceed twenty years. The basic resources
sector encompasses primary exploration and exploitation concerning min-
erals of any kind, including liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, gas and
oil pipelines, and timber. 92 In this sector as well, the Code allows the
member countries to establish their own rules for investment authorization,
divestment, 93 and limitation of profit remittances! 4 This has been effected
in Colombia by Decree 27888-73, in Ecuador by Supreme Decree 1029-71,
in Peru by Decree Law 18900-71, in Venezuela by Regulation 63-74, and
in Chile by Decrees 746 and 600.
In summary, once a foreign direct investment is authorized in any
sector, it is subject to all Code controls except that which limits profit
remittances where the investment is made in the basic resources sector.
Divestment, however, applies almost exclusively in the manufacturing in-
dustry, as will be discussed later.
B. Registration
After the proposed investment is authorized and effectuated, it must
be registered with the CNA. Foreign investments existing at the time
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the Code became effective were required to be registered within six
months thereafter. 95 Only registered investments qualify as the basis for
determining profit and capital remittances. 96
In the past, most Andean countries did not know how much foreign
capital was present in their territories, nor the exact activities in which
it was invested. Ten years ago, for example, the Peruvian Government had
to resort to the U.S. Embassy to obtain information in connection to the
foreign investment in Peru.97 A similar situation, found in the other An-
dean countries, caused many difficulties, especially in the annual fore-
casting of foreign exchange outflows. Permitting the issuance of bearer
stock in most countries compounded the difficulty of identifying those
activities controlled by foreign investors. 93
Since all foreign investment must now be registered, it is expected
that the host governments will be able to determine exactly the amount of
foreign investment in their territories, as well as the activities to which it
is committed. This understanding will help to determine the costs and the
benefits of that investment and consequently will enable the host country
to quantify its needs for foreign investment in each economic sector. 99
The Code also established that corporate stock should be issued in
nominative form. Existing stock in bearer form was required to be trans-
formed into nominative form within one year after the Code became
effective.100
In addition to registering foreign investment, the CNA supervises the
subsequent activities of foreign investors.101
However, testing theory against reality, a recent review of the dif-
ferent systems of registration in each Andean country concludes that reg.
istration has not been conducted systematically, and in some instances it
does not appear to have been done at all. There is an indication that ade-
quate and reliable figures of the amount of foreign investment in the
Andean Group are not available due to the lack of proper uniform forms;
what figures do exist may not be totally accurate.10 2 Perhaps this is one
of the reasons why no complete statistical data is available on the inflow
of foreign investment after the Code's adoption. Noticeably absent is any
discrimination between fresh capital and the reinvestment of profits.
Different CNA's have deviated from the rules on registration. For
example, one CNA has refused to register foreign investments expressing
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their value in freely convertible currency as Art. 5 of the Code expressly
commands. Another CNA requires, among other documents accompany-
ing the authorization request, a certificate indicating that the foreign in-
vestment is already in the country despite the Code requirement that it be
authorized first. Additional problems are created by the almost universal
requirement of dual or sequential registration. In Bolivia, the CNA for
registration was the Instituto de Inversiones Extranjeras (INI). However,
on September, 1974, Supreme Decree 11774 designated the Banco Central
de Bolivia as the single CNA for the country. Foreign investments pre-
viously registered with INI were required to reinscribe with the Bank.
In Chile, Decree 600 of July, 1974 designated as CNA the Cornitg de In-
versiones Extranjeras, an agency of the Corporaci6n de Fonento
(CORFO) ; however, investments must also be registered with the Banco
Central de Reserva. In Colombia, investments must be approved by the
Departamento de Planijicaci6n but are registered with the Banco Central.
In Ecuador, foreign investment must be approved by the Ministerio de
Industria, Comercio e Integraci6n and registered with the Banco Central.10 3
In Peru, Decree Law 18999 of October 1971 established a dual system
for both authorizations and registrations: 1) the ministry in charge of the
economic sector where the investment is made, and 2) the Comiti de
Inversiones y Tecnologfas Extranjeras (CITE), an agency of the Minis-
terio de Economia y Finanzas. In Venezuela. however, both approval and
registration are obtained from the Superintendencia de Inversionistas
Extranjeros, an agency of the Ministerio de Desarrollo.
It should be noted that the Code has not established express sanc-
tions for the investments which are not registered or are made without
previous authorization. There are quite a large number of investments in
this situation. To my knowledge, the authorities have not decided how to
treat these investments. The alternatives must be considered.
On the one hand, it may be asserted that these investments should
lose the right to remit profits abroad and to be repatriated upon their
liquidation because they have not acquired the status of "direct foreign
investment," as defined by the Code, which alone is entitled to remit-
tances abroad.
On the other hand, however, if an investor has several investments
in the country and fails to register or get authorization for one of them,
the above sanction would amount to a partial renunciation and, as noted
above, result in undue benefits to the foreign investments. Further, such
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sanction would allow juridical persons to circumvent the prohibition
against nationalizing some of their investments through renunciation of
remittances abroad.
The status of unregistered or unauthorized investments is thus un-
settled and controversial. One clear result of this situation is the inability
of these enterprises to remit profits. A definitive solution is needed. Per-
haps the most sensible sanction would be to admit an invalid authorization
and registration in addition to a fine and the obligatory sale to national
investors if the authorization is denied.
C. Prolit Remittances
Foreign investors have the right to remit abroad, yearly and in freely
convertible currency, proven net profits amounting to a maximum of
fourteen percent of their foreign direct investment. To exercise this right,
prior authorization must be obtained from the CNA.104
This definitely has been one of the most controversial provisions of the
Code.105 Initially, the controversy centered upon whether the fourteen
percent was intended to be a profit limitation. In practice, all the member
countries have indicated that it is not and that their intent is merely to
regulate the yearly outflow of foreign currency. Therefore, it is merely
a mechanism to alleviate balance of payments problems and not a limit
on profits remittances.
Nevertheless, there are a number of additional problems with regard
to which the member countries differ greatly. One of these is the base
against which this percentage is to be applied. For instance, what is the
result if investor A invests in enterprises X, Y, and Z and receives profit
distributions of ten percent from X, eighteen percent from Y, and fourteen
percent from Z. Is the fourteen percent limit computed on the total return
from all his investments in the country, or is it applied to each investment
separately? It must be recognized that the Code as currently drafted
admits either possibility, although the former seems fairer.
Even if the fourteen percent limitation refers to the total return
from all investments, what treatment should be accorded any excess? May
it be reinvested in full, carried forward and remitted in future years in
which the fourteen percent limit is not reached, or must it be retained
until the investor liquidates his investment and leaves the country? Some
tcountries, such as Peru, permit the excess to ,be reinvested in full; but
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others, Colombia for example, maintain that it cannot be reinvested, and
require that it be carried forward to a year in which the limit is not
reached or until the investment is liquidated. 10 6
All six countries, however, treat the limit as cumulative. That is to
say, if in year X net profits do not reach fourteen percent, profits from
previous years which exceeded fourteen percent may be remitted together
with profits from year X up to fourteen percent of the registered in-
vestment in year X. 107 However, if profits exceed fourteen percent every
year, what the investor is allowed to do with the excess varies from coun-
try to country. As seen above, in Peru he may apply for authorization to
reinvest excess profits in full; however, this alternative is not allowed in
Colombia, where he must keep the excess in national currency until the
moment the investment is liquidated. Only then is he authorized to remit
excess profits abroad in foreign currency together with the liquidated
capital. The inactivity of such monies seems to produce no benefit
for either country as will be discussed further in the analysis of the rein-
vestment rules.
Not all of the Andean countries have foreign exchange controls, and
enforcing the fourteen percent limit on profit remittances seems difficult
in countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela, which ack such controls, and
Ecuador, which has a limited system of dual rates. 10 8 This suggests the
need for the adoption of a common system of exchange control in the six
countries. As of December, 1974, both Bolivia and Ecuador allowed profits
in excess of the fourteen percent limit to be paid locally in their national
currencies. Only Venezuela had established a prohibition against paying
the excesses locally. 10 9
Another problem is posed by the interpretation of net profits. Tax
laws in all of the Andean countries differentiate between the earnings of
the enterprise and the earnings of its shareholders, using the term profit
(utilidades) for the first, and dividends (dividendos) for the second.
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Colombia: 21% to 45% 20%
Ecuador: 20% or 40% 40%
Peru: 20% to 55% 40% or 30%
Venezuela: 15% to 50% 15% or 30%
NOTE: This chart is intended solely to give a broad overview; obviously, each
country has rules which significantly alter the above figures. (Condensed from Price,
Waterhouse, Peat & Co., "Doing Business in Ancom", Lima, December, 1973).
Thus, the return from a foreign investment is taxed at two levels.
As phrased by the Code, then, the fourteen percent should be net of the first
tax, but not of the second. This appears to be the construction in Colombia,
while in Peru and Bolivia the fourteen percent limitation has been applied
against the net amount remittable abroad. 110
The Code provides three instances in which the fourteen percent
limit is discretionary. In the case of investments in the basic resources sec-
tor, all the member countries are expressly authorized to establish different
limits, if any," 1' which they are doing under special contracts." 2 Second,
under special circumstances, any member country may request authoriza-
tion from the Commission to establish different limits. 1 3 This exception has
not been used to date and prospects for its use are not great 1 4 since it seems
feasible only for amending the general limit for all six countries. 115 The
third exception is established in principle for foreign enterprises which ex-
port eighty percent or more of their production to non-Andean markets.
These enterprises in accordance with Art. 34 of the Code, are not subject to
the rules established in Chapter II of the Code; the chapter which specifies
the divestment requirement and establishes the fourteen percent limit on
profit remittances. However, the wording of the provision which established
the fourteen percent limitation has given rise to different interpretations.
The profit limit makes reference to foreign investors, while Art. 34 refers
to foreign enterprises. Thus, some argue that the enterprises which export
eighty percent of their production to non-Andean markets are still subject
to the fourteen percent limitation on profit remittances each year. As dis-
cussed previously, the definition of foreign enterprise includes both the
foreign investor, (the parent company) and the local subsidiary.11 6 Con-
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sequently, the fourteen percent limitation technically should not apply to
profits generated by the enterprises under discussion. This construction is
not uniformly accepted by the CNAs; consequently, the provision requires
clarification.
D. Reiavestments
A reinvestment is defined by the Code as the investment of all or part
of the undistributed profits generated by a foreign direct investment in the
same enterprise. 117 This definition creates a somewhat irrelevant distinction
between profits which are reinvested in the enterprise that generated them
and profits which are invested in other enterprises. As will be shown, both
are subject to essentially the same procedures, and both are characterized
ultimately as direct foreign investment.
To effect a reinvestment, as defined, a prior authorization from the
local CNA is required. 118 Prior authorization is also required to invest
profits in another enterprise. 119 Once authorized and effected, the reinvest-
ment must be registered;120 in this way, it acquires the status of a direct
foreign investment.121 As a result, these reinvested profits enlarge the basis
for remittances and may also be repatriated when liquidated.122
Requiring such authorization is designed to enable the government to
judge, in light of their developmental priorities and the specific necessities
of the respective enterprises, whether additional foreign investment is re-
quired and convenient.12 3
Annual reinvestments which do not exceed five percent of the com-
pany's capital are exempt from the authorization requiremenL124 Such re-
investments are required, however, to be registered after they are made in
order to qualify as direct foreign investment and thus be entitled to the
above-mentioned rights. In this manner, the Code acknowledges the need
of some enterprises to periodically reinvest profits in order to maintain
their normal rhythm of operations. The authorization procedure in such
cases would only be a dilatory bureaucratic procedure.'25 This exemption
is applicable only to profits invested in the same enterprise which generated
them.
The five percent reinvestment limitation is applied against the total
capital of the enterprise in which the reinvestment is made, not just against
the total direct foreign investment. However, the Code does not define the
term "capital. ' '12 6
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As applied to corporations, this term is subject to several interpreta-
tions: paid stock-capital, total stock-capital (totally subscribed but partially
paid), net worth (assets minus liabilities), or perhaps even working capital.
It would seem preferable to equate it to the paid stock-capital: if a stock
capital definition were adopted it would seem proper to require the pay-
ment of the unpaid portion first rather than call for an additional reinvest-
ment. Furthermore, because the exemption is a means of avoiding delays
in regularly infusing the capital which an enterprise may require, the con-
cepts of net worth or working capital are inappropriate. They are items
which usually require substantial computation before they can be deter-
mined; and even then, the results are usually controversial. The paid stock-
capital thus gives a more certain base for reference.
In practice, the two articles which requlate reinvestments have been
subject to a variety of interpretations12 7 It has been argued that prior au-
thorization for reinvestment is not applicable to profits generated by mixed
or national enterprises. This point of view is based on a literal construction
of Art. 12, which refers to the reinvestment of the profits realized by a
foreign enterprise. Consequently, it has been alleged that profits realized by
other kinds of enterprises, viz., national or mixed, may be reinvested with-
out prior authorization. This argument has been rejected in Peru. However,
it must be noted that the poor wording of these articles and of the definition
of foreign enterprise leaves room for this type of argument. The definition
of foreign enterprise is too broad: it applies both to the parent company
and to the local subsidiary. Thus, when the reinvestment rules refer to
foreign enterprise, they could well be referring to either the parent or the
subsidiary. Therefore, it would seem proper to clear up the ambiguity by
restricting the definition of foreign enterprises as suggested or by amend-
ing the text of Art. 12 to refer specifically to foreign investors. 128
An additional difficulty is determining what limit, if any, is estab-
lished by the Code on the annual reinvestable amounts (per enterprise)
which can be authorized by the CNAs. Three constructions have been
adopted by different members. 1) The maximum amount which can be re-
invested each year is the fourteen percent which can be remitted abroad
yearly; this is the alternative implemented by Colombia in 1973.129 2)
The, maximum amount which can be reinvested yearly is that fourteen
percent plus the five percent which does not require authorization; this is
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the alternative adopted by Ecuador. 130 3) According to the Peruvian con-
struction, the yearly reinvestments are not limited by the Code: the CNA
may authorize any amount.
This point of divergence arises because of the construction given to
the phrase "amounts which have the right to be remitted abroad." '131 As
may be recalled, this concept limits assets which can be classified as direct
foreign investment. Thus, if the profits in excess of fourteen percent are
not considered remittable abroad in the same year those profits were pro-
duced, then alternative 1) is correct. However, if such excess profits are
remittable abroad, either in following years or when the capital is liqui-
dated, then alternative 3) is correct. Further, if one follows the intent
of the Code draftsmen, then alternative 2) is correct. 132 In my opinion, the
Code should not be construed as imposing any limits on the amounts
which can be reinvested. However, this conclusion does not imply that
prior authorization is not necessary. If the CNA analyzes the capital re-
quirements of an enterprise and concludes that it needs additional foreign
inputs, it would not seem logical to make such sums inactive. This is the
result if the amount which can be reinvested is arbitrarily limited without
granting the CNA the opportunity to judge each case. However, a unified
set of criteria for this and other problems relating to reinvestment rules is
dependent, to a large extent, on solutions to the problems of profit remit-
tances.
E. Capital Repatriation
Foreign investors have the right to re-export or repatriate their in-
vested capital (as defined infra) in the following cases: 1) when they
sell their stock, shares, or other ownership rights, and 2) when the re-
spective enterprise is liquidated. 133
Re-exportable capital is defined as the amount of initial registered
direct foreign investment, plus any reinvestment made in the same enter-
prise in accordance with the Code, less any net losses.1 4 In case of a liqui-
dation of the enterprise, the difference between the real value of net assets
and the re-exportable capital is considerable as a capital gain and may be
remitted abroad after payment of the applicable taxes.
1 5
Remittance of the net proceeds of the sale of stock, shares, or other
ownership rights is automatic only if the purchaser is a national in-
vestor.1 36 In the case of a foreign purchaser, the sale requires previous
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authorization from the local CNA. However, payment for such a pur-
chase must be made abroad because the proceeds will not be considered
repatriable capital and thus are not entitled to be re-exported in foreign
currency.137
This provision is designed to afford priority to national investors in
acquiring investments sold by foreigners. However, in many cases, CNAs
authorize the purchase by another foreign investor if "the transaction does
not cause an outflow of foreign currency from the host country."' 38 As has
been noted, this is not the purpose of the rule, nor could such outflow
legally occur. With such criteria all purchases would be authorized. A pre-
ferable alternative would be for the CNA to require proof that the seller
has unsuccessfully attempted to find national buyers. To effectuate this end,
it could establish as a condition that the securities be offered first through
a stock exchange for a reasonable period. If no national buyers are found




The CNA is required to approve in advance all contracts for foreign
source borrowing. The proceeds must be registered with the CNA upon
their entry into the country. 13 9
This requirement is intended to control the payment of credits and
interest which have a significant effect on the balance of payments of the
host country. It also corrects the historic abuse of disguising profit remit-
tances as commissions and interest and generating false expenses for the
local corporation, thereby unduly diminishing the tax base of the host
government.14 0
The authorization from the CNA can be requested either for a specific
credit or for a global line of credit.' 4 ' By admitting this latter form, the
Code intends to avoid unnecessary delays and facilitate the operation of
those enterprises which require a periodic flow of credit from abroad.
Once the CNA approves the line of credit, for a maximum amount and a
fixed period of time, the enterprise is required to register the amounts
which are used upon their entry into the country.
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In cases of credit contracts between a parent company and its affil-
iate, or between two affiliates of the same parent company, the effective
rate of interest may not exceed by more than three points the prime
interest rate in the financial market of the country of origin of the
currency in which the contract is registered. In all other cases of foreign
borrowing, the interest will be determined by the CNA and must closely
approximate the prevailing rate of interest in the financial market of
the country in which the operation is registered. The effective interest
rate is understood to include the total cost to the debtor for the use of
the borrowed capital, including commissions and all other charges. 142
The payment abroad of the capital and interest due is authorized
only for the amounts which have been previously registered and author-
ized with the CNA in accordance with the above-mentioned rules.
Once again, the implementation of these regulations poses a number
of problems caused by the lack of clear definitions. Although the rules
refer to parent company and to affiliate, the Code does not define them.
Accordingly, varying definitions have been implemented by the member
countries. For example, the Peruvian CNA has adopted the following
operational definitions:
1. An "affiliate" is any foreign enterprise in which fifty percent
or more of its capital belongs, directly or indirectly, to a non-
resident foreign enterprise, or in which foreign ownership is
less than fifty percent but foreign control of the administrative,
financial, commercial, or technical functions is greater than
fifty percent.
2. A "parent company" is any juridical entity which owns fifty
percent or more of the capital stock of a foreign resident enter-
prise and/or controls its technical, administrative, financial,
or commercial activities.
3. A "nonresident affiliate" is any juridical entity not residing
in the country (Peru) which depends-financially (through
stock ownership) and/or structurally (through administrative,
commercial and technical control)-on another nonresident
foreign company which is classified as a parent company.
The ambiguity noted above in discussing the general classifications
of the Code is also found, to a large extent, in these operational defini-
tions. Moreover, the definitions of parent company and non-resident. af-
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filiates have been unnecessarily restricted to corporations when, as noted
supra, the term enterprise was intended by the Code to be more compre-
hensive. These definitions also have failed to establish guidelines for
determining what constitutes a resident or a nonresident enterprise, and,
even more critical, what is encompassed by administrative, commercial,
financial, and technical control. Obviously, these concepts require com-
mon, specific definitions applicable to all six countries.
Finally, the member governments are prohibited from guaranteeing
in any way, either directly or through official or semi-official institutions,
the external credit operations of foreign enterprises in which the state
does not participate. 143 Since this type of guarantee diminishes the national
quotas which the countries have in international organizations, this pro-
vision is designed to cover such quotas with guarantees for priority
development projects. It is also assumed that the foreign investor usually
has international financing contacts which easily can provide such guaran-
tees for him. Within the general strategy of the Code, this restriction is
also intended to promote the national or mixed forms of enterprise, which
are not subject to this restriction.'"
2. INTERNAL
"Since the activities of foreign investors in developing countries have
often been financed almost exclusively with local savings, it was deemed
necessary to restrict such use of the national credit sources. 1 l 5 Thus, it
has been established that foreign enterprises may only borrow short-term
capital in the local financial markets of the Andean countries.146 The
terms and conditions of such borrowing were to be specified by the Com-
mission shortly after the enactment of the Code through regulations which
have not been issued to date. Therefore, this matter is still subject to the
internal laws of each member country.147 It is unnecessary to emphasize
the urgency of enacting such uniform regulations. Hopefully, they will
include a clear definition of short-term borrowing as well as rules pro-
hibiting the indefinite renewal of such loans, which is, in fact, medium
or long-term borrowing. An additional point to be defined is whether these
restrictions apply only to borrowing from credit institutions or also to
general market financing, as in the issuance of bonds. The provision ap-
pears to refer to all forms of borrowing; however, some governments have
established the contrary indirectly or by default and allow, for example,
the issuance of bonds by foreign enterprises.
148
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National and mixed enterprises are not subject to these restrictions.
It is unclear whether foreign enterprises which are divesting are subject
to them during the period of their transformation. We will return to this
point when examining the effects of divestment.
G. Transfers of Technology
The Code requires that all contracts for the importation of technology,
patents, or trademarks must receive prior authorization by the CNA. 149
In screening these contracts, the CNA seeks to assess the real contribution
to the development of the country, which will be rendered by the im-
ported technology thereby avoiding the purchase of the obsolete or over-
priced.150 To implement these objectives, the Code provides for the crea-
tion of a Subregional Office of Industrial Property. 15' This entity is to
serve as a coordinating office among the local CNAs and is charged with
compiling statistical information concerning the flow of technology to
the Andean countries, drafting form contracts for licensing agreements,
and rendering general technical advice on these matters to the member
countries. The countries are also committed to the development of local
technology and the adaptation of imported technology. In this manner
the CNAs will obtain the necessary parameters to properly assess the
importation contracts for which they are responsible.
1. AUTHORIZATION
The Code has fixed a number of guidelines for the approval of such
contracts. Certain clauses must appear in all contracts; while a number
have been prohibited. These are:
1. Obligatory clauses: 152
a. Identification of the modalities of the imported technology.
b. Contractual value of each and every element the technology
transferred.
c. Term of the contract.
2. Prohibited clauses: 153
a. Clauses by which the recipient of the technology is obliged to
buy any kind of goods or to use the services of personnel desig-
nated by the provider of the technology. As an exception, it is
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permissible to approve clauses which require the purchase of
capital or intermediate goods or raw materials, provided that
their price corresponds to the international market rates.
b. Clauses granting the right to provider of the technology to fix
the prices of sale or resale of the products produced with his
technology.
c. Clauses restricting the volume or structure of the recipient's pro-
duction in any way.
d. Clauses directly or indirectly prohibiting the use of competitive
technologies.
e. Clauses granting the provider of the technology with partial or
total purchase options to the goods produced with that technology.
f. Clauses obliging the transfer, to the provider of any inventions
or improvements obtained through the use of such technology.
g. 'Clauses obliging the payment of royalties for non-utilized patents.
h. Clauses prohibiting or limiting in any way the export of products
created with the technology. The CNAs are authorized to grant
exceptions in cases where they deem it necessary.
i. Clauses whereby the technology is capitalized. 154
j. Clauses purporting to submit conflicts to a jurisdiction or laws
other than the ones of the recipient country.155
k. 'Clauses allowing subrogation by foreign states of the rights and
actions of the provider of the technology.156
I. Clauses purporting to obtain an equivalent effect to the above.
mentioned.
Contracts for the use of foreign trademarks may not contain the
following clauses :157
1. 'Prohibiting the export to or sale in certain countries of the products
manufactured under the licensed trademark, or the sale of similar
products;
2. Requiring the use of any goods provided by the licensor of the trade-
mark or its affiliates, although an exception may be granted if the
prices approximate international standards;
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3. Fixing sale or resale prices of the products manufactured under the
trademark;
4. Requiring payments for trademarks not used;
5. Requiring the permanent use of personnel from or appointed by the
provider of the trademark;
6. Submitting conflicts to a foreign jurisdiction or law;1S
7. Providing subrogation by a foreign state of the actions and rights of
the provider of the trademark ;159 and
8. Causes of equivalent effect.
In screening the contracts, the CNAs are required to give preference
to those providing local or subregional technology. The Commission may
propose to the member countries the establishment of special duties on
products bearing foreign trademarks which embody readily available
technology. 160
If these requirements are met, and the economic evaluation is favor-
able, the CNA will authorize the contracts. As is standard, royalties are
remittable only under contracts which have been authorized. 61
Royalties may not be paid, however, with respect to intangible tech-
nology provided by a parent company to an affiliate or between affiliates
of the same company.162 Nor will they be deductible for income tax pur-
poses.163 As noted above, the Code does not define parent company nor
affiliate, and it is urgent that common definitions be adopted for these
terms. Of even greater importance is the Code's failure to define intan-
gible technological contributions. Some guidance may be derived from a
sample form found in Annex No. 1 to the Code, an application for CNA
authorization for direct foreign investment in any Andean country. It
contains a listing of tangible and intangible resources. But this listing
may not be definitive since the prohibition refers to a distinction not be-
tween resources, but between tangible and intangible technologies, and this
distinction appears to refer to something more specific than resources in
general. Some Peruvian officials believe that distinguishing the term
intangible technological contributions is intended to exclude foreign trade-
marks and technical assistance:164 on the other hand, Venezuela's Decree
63 avoids the distinction between tangible and intangible technologies
entirely. The Venezuelan version refers solely to technological contribu-
tions, and does not mention intangible. Furthermore, Decree 63 defines
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technological contributions as all supply, sale, lease, or assignment of
trademarks, patents, or industrial models; assistance on technical or ad-
ministrative procedures by qualified personnel; instruments, models, doc-
uments, or instructions on processes or methods of manufacture; and any
other goods or services of a similar nature so qualified by the CNA. 165
A recent decision of the Commission has increased the uncertainty
concerning the interpretation of these terms. In Decision 84, the Commis-
sion approved the Bases for a Subregional Technological Policy. This
decision adopted, among others, two new concepts: modular technology,
defined as the knowledge which characterizes or is inherent in a produc-
tive process or the rendering of a service; and peripheral technology,
defined as the knowledge which is not intrinsic to the creation of a product
or process or the rendering of a service; but which is necessary to utilize
the modular technology in the production of goods or services or even in
the generation of other knowledge. 166
These developments indicate that the distinction between tangible and
intangible technologies should be abandoned, and the rule applied to
transfers of technology in general. Decision 84 could be helpful insofar
as it defines technology as the sets of knowledge which are indispensable
for transforming components into products, for using them, or for render-
ing services. However, if these definitions are restrictively applied to the
prohibition of royalty payments between parent and affiliate, they would
not encompass payments for trademarks. This discrimination would seem
rather illogical; for if payments for technology are forbidden, why
shouldn't payments for trademarks between parent and affiliate or be-
tween affiliates also be forbidden? 167 In any case, Decision 84 is not yet
in force in any Andean country. When it becomes effective, an express
amendment will certainly be required to solve the questions regarding
the rules for technology.
2. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CODE
Within the framework established by Decision 84, the Commission
has issued an Industrial Property Code through Decision 85.169 This Code
specifically regulates invention patents, industrial drawings and models,
and trademarks. Under its provisions only new inventions which have
industrial applicability, or which improve such inventions, may be pat-
ented. An invention will not be considered novel if it is known to the
public, whether through oral or written description, or by its use or ex-
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ploitation, or by any other means sufficient to allow the use of the inven-
tion before its patent is requested. There are several specific cases which
are exempt from this rule.
The invention must be manufactured or used by a form of industry
in order to be considered as having industrial applicability. Scientific
principles or discoveries, as well as the discovery of substances existing
in nature; commercial, financial, accounting, and similar plans; thera-
peutic methods; and esthetic creations will not qualify as novel. Further-
more, no patents may be granted for inventions which violate the public
order or the common good concerning vegetable varieties or animal
species, pharmaceutical products, medications, therapeutically active sub-
stances, beverages, or food. Foreign inventions for which a patent is
requested more than one year after the patent was requested in another
country may not be patented. In addition, the member countries may
prohibit the granting of patents for processes, products, or groups of
products, if they deem fit.
The grant of a patent entitles the holder to its exclusive use, to assign
one or more licenses for its use, and to receive royalties for its use by
third parties. The patent grant does not include, however, the exclusive
right to import the patented product or the product manufactured through
the patented procedure. Patents will be valid for a period of five years
and may be renewed once for an addiional term of five years. The holder
of the patent must start using it within three years following its grant and
must inform the CNA of the date of initial utilization. Assignments to
third parties must also be reported to the CNA.
Trademarks may be registered for a period of five years and are
renewable indefinitely. However, only novel, visible, and sufficiently dis-
tinctive trademarks may be registered.
In general, these are the main provisions of the Industrial Property
Code. A detailed analysis, such as it deserves is beyond the scope of this
paper.1 70 Decision 85 has not yet been implemented; however, it is ex-
pected that the member countries will enact it soon.
H. Jurisdiction
Th Code has prohibited instruments relating to investments or the
transfer of technology from including clauses that remove possible con-
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
flicts from the jurisdiction and laws of the recipient country or allow
the subrogation by states to the rights and actions of their national
investors.171
This provision is undoubtedly derived from the Calvo Clause. 172
However, it does not require the express submission to the jurisdiction
and laws of the recipient country, nor does it require waiver of diplo-
matic protection, as the original Calvo clause did. Of course, the instru-
ments concerning investments or the transfer of technology will not include
clauses expressly removing jurisdiction or allowing subrogation. But, is
that equivalent to requesting express submission to the jurisdiction and
laws of the recipient country? Has the Code intended to relax the strict-
ness of the Calvo Clause?
Furthermore, the interdiction of contract subrogation only prohibits
the investor's state of origin from intervening, not the subrogation by
international agencies. Was this intentional, or did it only result from
the draftsmen's focus on a traditional sore point? Is this an open door to
the future adherence to IDRB's Center for Dispute Settlement? 173 Or, is
it a special provision designed to benefit CAF, the Andean Development
Corporation, which is a legal entity in international public law?174
Thus far, few answers are obvious. This provision initially prevented
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) from operating in
the Andean Group. 175 However, OPIC's 1974 report indicates coverage
has been granted for operations in Bolivia and Venezuela. Bolivia ap-
pears to construe the Code's jurisdictional rules as not applying to in-
dustries whose products do not benefit from the Andean tariff reductions.
Peru has recently waived Peruvian jurisdiction in a contract with Japanese
investors for the financing of an oil pipeline.176 The Peruvian Govern-
ment has thereby confirmed that the Code does not apply to foreign
financing. Chile has also announced its intention to negotiate foreign
capital withdrawal guarantees which could be in violation of this
provision prohibiting contract subrogation. 77
V. DIVESTMENT
A. Mechanics
The second system contained in the Code is the "Transformacion"
(hereafter referred to as Divestment).178 The Andean Divestment is es-
sentially a system whereby national investors179 shall acquire the majority
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ownership and control of the enterprises operating in the host country
progressively and in a maximum number of years. That is to say, in the
words of the Code, foreign enterprises shall become national or mixed
enterprises.
The Andean system of divestment in its original form is basically
applicable to foreign industrial enterprises in the manufacturing sector.
As previously indicated, divestment of foreign enterprises in basic re-
sources, public services, internal marketing, mass media, and financing
activities is subject to different rules in each country. The emphasis on
the manufacturing sector is not misplaced since it is vital to the Andean
developmental strategy, and it is in this sector where the highest concen-
tration of foreign investment is found.'80
1. TYPES
The divestment system is obligatory only in certain cases. Those en-
terprises which were operating or were created on or before June 30, 1971
are not required to divest, but their products do not qualify for the
benefits of the Trade Liberalization Program. 81
These pre-existing enterprises were granted a three-year period cal-
culated from the time the Code became effective to determine whether to
divest'18 2 In Colombia and Venezuela, where the Code was adopted later
than in the other member countries, the problem facing foreign enter-
prises is the treatment which their products should receive during the
three-year period. It has not been possible to collect any information
concerning this problem.
It is important to note that an initial decision to refrain from di-
vesting does not preclude a subsequent contrary decision, in which case
the enterprise does qualify for trade benefits.18 3
Divestment is also voluntary for the foreign enterprises which export
eighty percent or more of their production to non-Andean markets. Should
this percentage decline, these enterprises also will not benefit from the
Trade Liberalization Program. 84
Divestment is obligatory for all foreign enterprises created after
June 30, 1971. These enterprises must execute a divestment agreement
with the local CNA on behalf of their investors18 5 Thus, although it is
still possible to establish a totally foreign-owned enterprise, a divestment
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agreement on the terms discussed below must be submitted as a precon-
dition to authorization from CNA. Interestingly, the Code has failed to
prescribe any sanction, aside from the loss of trading benefits,18 6 for
enterprises which fail to divest as required. This point needs to be clarified
because divestment would in fact become voluntary for all enterprises
under the current provisions.
2. SCHEDULES
The time limit for divestment varies in relation to both the country
in which the foreign enterprise is located and the date on which it started
its activities.
The owners of foreign enterprises operating on or before June 30,
1971, who decide to divest must do so by becoming at least mixed en-
terprises in a maximum period of fifteen years in Colombia, Chile, Peru,
and Venezuela, and twenty years in Ecuador and Bolivia. The maximum
period is calculated from the date the Code became effective in each
country. Within the first three years fifteen percent of the ownership and
control of the enterprise must be transferred to national investors; and
at the expiration of two-thirds of the allotted time national investors
must have acquired at least a forty-five percent interest in ownership and
control of the enterprise.18 7 Thus, the divestment time-table for the enter-
prises operating on or before June 30, 1971 may be summarized as follows:
Colombia, Chile Bolivia
Peru, Venezuela T Ecuador %
3 years 15 3 years 15
10 years 45 13 years 45
& 4 months
15 years 51 20 years 51
NOTE: These figures denote a maximum time and a minimum for percentages of
national ownership and control. The time periods are computed from the date the
Code became effective.
Owners of foreign enterprises created after June 30, 1971 have a
maximum period of fifteen years in Colombia, 'Chile, Peru, and Vene-
zuela, and twenty years in Ecuador and Bolivia to transform their com-
panies into mixed enterprises. However, owners of such enterprises in
Colombia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela must have transferred fifteen per-
cent of: their ownership and control to national investors when the enter-
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prise commences production. The Code does not specify when production
is considered to have started; usually it is established on a case-by-case
basis in the divestment agreements contracted with the CNA. When one
third of the divestment period has elapsed, national participation must
be at least thirty percent and at the two-thirds mark, not less than forty-
five percent. At the end of the fifteeen-year period, participation of na-
tional investors in ownership and control of the enterprise must total
fifty-one percent.188
In Bolivia and Ecuador, national participation in foreign enter-
prises created after June 30, 1971 must reach at least five percent three
years after production begins, ten percent when one-third of the divest-
ment period has elapsed, at least thirty-five percent after two-thirds of
the period, and fifty-one percent after twenty years. 1
89
The time table for this divestment is as follows:
Chile, Colombia
Peru, Venezuela % Bolivia and Ecuador %
3 years 15 3 years 5
5 years 30 6 years & 8 months 10
10 years 45 13 years & 4 months 35
15 years 51 20 years 51
NOTE: These figures denote a maximum time and a minimum percentage of na-
tional ownership and control. The time periods are computed from the day the
enterprise commenced production.
The Code provides that enterprises in which the state or state enter-
prise has a thirty percent participation in the stock and determining
capacity will be considered a mixed enterprise.' 90 Therefore, this compo-
sition constitutes an alternative to the system described above.
3. AGREEMENTS
The divestment system is implemented through required contracts
with the local CNA which must contain the following provisions:191
1. The fixed divestment period cannot exceed the limits indicated above.
2. The transfer of ownership and control to the national investors must
proceed, at least at the applicable rate indicated above.
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3. Assurances must be given concerning the progressive participation of
national investors, or their representatives, in the direction of the
technical, financial, managerial, and business aspects of the enterprise,
from the date it starts production.
4. The manner in which the stock, shares or equity rights shall be valued
at the time of their sale must be specified.
5. A system of assured transfer to national investors of stock, shares, or
rights must be indicated.
4. EFFECTS
Foreign enterprises in the process of divesting will qualify for tariff
benefits under the free trade system in the Andean countries. 192 Upon qual-
ifying as mixed or national enterprises, they continue their ANCOM free
trade benefits and, in addition, should be relieved from restrictions on
their access to local credit and from limits on reinvestment. They also
become eligible for activity in the country's reserved sectors. It remains
uncertain, however, which of these restrictions are lifted with respect to
the enterprises which are in the process of divesting but are not yet na-
tional or mixed enterprises.
B. Implementation
Implementation of the divestment system has been more limited in
scope than implementation of the system of controls. Among other reasons,
this results from the Code having provided a delay of at least three years
before the companies are forced to start divesting. Peru has accumulated
the most significant experience with this system through the implementa-
tion of internal laws which required owners of manufacturing industries
to divest even before the Andean Code was adopted. The following dis-
cussion will be based on the Peruvian experience. 19 3
In July of 1970, Peru enacted a General Law of Industries, 194 re-
quiring all privately-owned industrial enterprises employing six or more
persons and with an annual gross income of more than U.S. $22,000 to
establish an Industrial Community. That Community is a juridical person
comprising all of the workers of the enterprise. Each year the enterprise
must distribute ten percent of its net income to the members of the Com-
munity. In addition, another fifteen percent of the net income must be
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reinvested by the Community in the enterprise and capitalized. If the
capital is not needed, the fifteen percent contribution is used to buy exist-
ing shares from the stockholders, who are obliged to sell in equal pro-
portions until the Community acquires fifty percent of the capital of the
enterprise. At that point the yearly distributions cease. Initially, the Com-
munity is represented by a single member on the board of directors, but
its representation increases in proportion to its ownership share.
195
It should be noted that the Peruvian General Law of Industries did
not specify a time limit within which the Communities must acquire a
fifty percent ownership share. Accordingly, several large firms have
managed to keep the growth of the community stock participation to a
minimum. 196
When Peru adopted the Andean Code, it also amended its Law of
Industries to conform with the time limits fixed therein for achieving
majority national ownership. 197 In Decree Law 18999, a twofold mechanism
was specified whereby national participation is created: first, through
the yearly fifteen percent participation of the Community; and secondly,
through a forced sale by the foreign investors if the Community's par-
ticipation is not sufficient to meet the timing deadlines of divestment.
If the foreign investor has not been able to sell the required amount to
a national investor within thirty days before the deadline, he is obligated
to sell to the Community and to grant a credit to the Community on the
conditions fixed by Art. 13 of Decree Law 18999. To date foreign in-
vestors have been able in most cases to divest to national investors other
than the Community.19"
A novel aspect of the Peruvian implementation is the scope of di-
vestment. Decree Law 18999 established that all manufacturing industries
and fishing enterprises should become mixed or national enterprises
within the maximum time limits fixed by the Andean Code. (Since fishing
enterprises were expropriated by the state through Decree Law 20000,
the divestment requirement is now applied to manufacturing industries
alone.) Divestment is obligatory for all manufacturing industries, regard-
less of whether they are interested in benefitting from the free trade
in ANCOM. This obligation was ratified through Decree Laws 19262 and
19863.199 Contrast this result with the Code, which makes divestment
voluntary for pre-existing enterprises.
Decree Law 19863 also established that the divestment agreements
should be consummated by June 30, 1974. Additionally, manufacturing
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enterprises were required to have achieved fifteen percent national par-
ticipation by that date. An example of the results of this provision is the
U.S. car manufacturer which was required to sell seventeen percent of its
equity to two local businessmen, while the participation of its Community
remained at one percent.200
Aside from the Community's participation, the divestment agreements
allow national participation to be established by any one or more of the
following means: 1) sale to national investors; 2) renunciation by the
foreign investor of the re-exportation of capital and profit remittance
abroad; 3) merger of enterprises; 4) thirty percent state participation
with veto power; 5) capital increases through contributions of national
investors.
The valuation of stock sold to a national investor, is established
under Decree Law 18999 as that price payable by a buyer in an arm's
length transaction. If no agreement is reached, it will be fixed consider-
ing the quotation for those securities in the Lima stock exchange. In
the absence of a quotation for that stock (which is most likely in view
of the incipient state of Peru's stock market), the value must be estab-
lished in accordance with the appraisal system established by Decree Law
19419: the difference between assets and liabilities, qualified by Title II
of this Decree, essentially establishes a modified book value approach.
As to the rules "assuring the progressive participation of national
investors, or their representatives, in the technical, financial, managerial,
and business direction of the enterprise," the Peruvian CNA has looked
to the nationality of the members of the board of directors and of the
top managers. Toward this end, the enterprises were obliged to com-
municate to the CNA the nationality of their directors and top managers,
and to inform it of any changes in makeup. In fact, the staff of most
enterprises is already largely, if not totally, composed of Peruvian
nationals.
Until recently, the Peruvian CNA has been "temporarily" classifying
enterprises as national, mixed, or foreign exclusively on the nationality
of their stockholders. Apparently, they will start, or have started, to re-
classify the enterprises by considering the nationality of the directors and
top managers. Neither criteria, however, assures a change in the behavior
of the enterprises. 20 1
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VI. FINAL COMMENT
Obviously the implementation of the Code is anything but clear and
uniform. Commencing with the delayed enactment of several Decisions
and, indeed, of the Code itself, and continuing through the varying and
contradictory interpretations of numerous Code provisions, uniformity
and clarity have been manifestly lacking.
As noted, the common and joint implementation of a minimal legal
framework for foreign investment by the six member countries is essen-
tial both for the protection of the host countries and for the encourage-
ment of an adequate inflow of foreign resources. The effectiveness of the
Code was conceived as depending on a common implementation. In reality,
however, the series of ambiguities and divergent practices have served to
blunt its usefulness.
The adoption of a comprehensive set of regulations for the Andean
Code thus appears to be of utmost necessity in order to overcome the
current uncertainties. The foregoing examination is intended as a very
minor contribution to the identification of some of the main points of
divergence or uncertainty which should be clarified through the adop-
tion of such common regulations. I believe that the enactment of uniform
regulations and, consequently, the consistent implementation of the Andean
Code may be the foremost test of the genuine will of the Andean countries
for an integration beyond that of dec.eptive rhetoric.
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